Letter to President Bush
In response to a recent policy statement from the Bush administration, an impressive group of legislators wrote the following letter to President Bush:
December 5, 2005
The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing you to express our strong concern about the draft U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine being prepared by the Pentagon. This draft calls for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to make pre-emptive strikes, if necessary on adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction.
We recognize that in large part the draft "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" is based on principles contained in the 1995 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other directives published by the Bush administration since 2001. For instance, your 2002 National Security Presidential Directive 17 reportedly states, “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force - including potentially nuclear weapons to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”
On the other hand, the language in the draft doctrine removes the ambiguity of the previous doctrine, and now suggests that your administration will use nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear WMD threats and suggests that this use could include pre-emptive nuclear strikes thereby increasing reliance on nuclear weapons.
On page III-2 of the March 15, 2005 draft, it states that combatant commanders may request Presidential approval for pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons under such conditions as:
- To counter an adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations;
- To counter an imminent attack from an adversary’s biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy;
- To attack on adversary installations including weapons of mass destruction, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons, or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies;
- To counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces;
- To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary WMD use.
We believe this effort to broaden the range of scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be contemplated is unwise and provocative.
The costs of using a nuclear weapon in the cases contemplated would almost always outweigh the benefits. Many potential targets are near major population centers. Striking a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons cache would require perfect intelligence and is impossible to do without significant collateral damage.
The draft doctrine says that the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation but notes that no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from using nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In other words, the draft Pentagon doctrine seems to conclude the United States is legally free to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively if it chooses, even against non-nuclear weapon states.
This drastic shift in U.S. nuclear policy threatens the very foundation of nuclear arms control as shaped by the 1970 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which has helped prevent nuclear proliferation for over 35 years. In the context of efforts to strengthen and extend the treaty, the United States issued a negative nuclear security assurance in 1978, reiterated in 1995, that the United States would not use nuclear force against NPT member countries without nuclear weapons unless attacked by a non nuclear-weapon state that is allied with a nuclear-weapon state.
The draft doctrine contradicts clear statements and assurances of your administration. On February 22, 2002 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated a similar version of the negative nuclear security pledge: “The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear- weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association with a nuclear weapon state.”
Abandoning this clear negative security assurance under the NPT would further undermine the treaty and our many other efforts to prevent others developing or using nuclear weapons. Partly as a result of U.S. inflexibility on key disarmament issues, your administration has already squandered opportunities to build greater global support for measures to update and strengthen the nonproliferation system.
In addition, this new doctrine, if approved, could exacerbate the danger of nuclear proliferation by giving states of concern, such as North Korea and Iran, an excuse to maintain their nuclear weapons options and would send a green light to the world’s nuclear states that it is permissible to use these weapons offensively.
The draft nuclear doctrine also appears to undermine the credibility of other U.S. negative security assurances, such as those contained in the recent six-party statement of principles outlining the terms for the verifiable and complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities.
Mr. President, it is one thing to threaten a devastating response to a biological or chemical weapons attack or the threat of a biological, chemical, or nuclear attack. It is quite another to say explicitly that the United States is prepared to counter non-nuclear weapons threats or attempt to pre-empt a suspected WMD attack by striking with nuclear weapons.
As former Secretary of State Powell said in response to the possibility that India and Pakistan might use nuclear weapons during their confrontation in the summer of 2002: “Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some deterrent effect, and so be it, but to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age seems to me to be something that no side should be contemplating.”
We urge you to personally review the draft doctrine and consider its serious negative consequences for U.S. national and international security interests. U.S. nuclear use policy and doctrine should be consistent with your often stated goal of significantly reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons worldwide.
Thank you for considering our suggestions and we look forward to your reply.
Sincerely,
Sens. Dianne Feinstein (CA), Daniel Akaka (HI), Edward Kennedy (MA),
Jack Reed (RI), Byron Dorgan (ND), John Kerry (MA), Frank Lautenberg
(NJ) and Reps. Ellen Tauscher (CA), Neil Abercrombie (HI), Rob Andrews
(NJ), Marty Meehan (MA), Ed Markey (MA), Susan Davis (CA), Loretta
Sanchez (CA), Adam Smith (WA), and Mark Udall (CO).
Early Warning
William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security
Russia Nukes the United StatesCode Name of the Week: Slomonia
Scooter Schmooter, Russia is about to nuke the United States.
Tomorrow, the U.S. military begins its largest "national" military exercise of the fiscal year, an exercise that posits a return of the "old guard" to Russia and a crisis that ends in a nuclear attack on the United States….
In the scenario, according to internal exercise papers obtained by this washingtonpost.com blogger, "Slomonia" loses ally "Ublame" in a "domestically driven political realignment." Slomonia adopts a more aggressive foreign policy, which re-ignites what the war gamers call a "mini-Cold War."…
The exercise scenarios begin with the Russian loss of Ukraine and a decline in relations with the west. Russia begins to mobilize in response to increasing NATO troops on its border and then it deploys long-range bombers to the Arctic and the Far East. To "punish" the West, according to the classified exercise papers, Russia begins to provide support for "old clients long abandoned," primarily the Northeast Asian country of Purple (aka North Kraal in early exercise papers), which is North Korea.
During a 60 day "time warp" mid-way in the exercise scenario to fast forward to the nuclear war, North Korea and Russia prepare to nuke the United States with missiles and bombers. The war gamers call the eventual Russian bomber attack on Alaska and the continental United States "non-doctrinal," that is, physically impossible and implausible, but necessary in the war game in order to practice air intercepts and achieve victory for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
Herein lies the corrupt nature of this kind of war gaming. Everything but the kitchen sink is thrown in to improve the "play" and stress the days of the hundreds of gamers -- a decline in U.S.-Russian relations, war with North Korea, ballistic missile defenses, terrorist attacks, cyber warfare, evacuation of Washington. The "simultaneous" Armageddons become a confirmation of questionable assumptions. The real effect of all of this is merely to justify weapons, levels of spending, and the policies that are being pursued, not to "test" them.”
So starts an October 31, 2005 Washington Post article by William Arkin. Clearly, the US is still willing to spend millions of dollars simulating a nuclear war. Hopefully, this game is, as Arkin suggests, primarily about keeping $40 billion for nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the budget. No one is contemplating playing such a game for real, right?
John Hallam of Friends of the Earth Sydney comments:
What Arkin - and the US military that does these exercises - fails to mention is that if Russia really were to nuke the US, the US would be toast several times over, with hardly a single person and no cities at all, left. The survival of not only US citizens, but of most land-based living things all over the world would be problematic. (This assumes current or near current warhead levels of round 2,500 warheads, used for 'city busting'.) US/Russia thermonuclear war is not an event one can 'manage'. It is an event that would be terminal at least for both societies and probably for most humans and other living things.
As early as August 2005, Philip Giraldi, writing in the American Conservative magazine, started an article about Iran as follows:
In Washington it is hardly a secret that the same people in and around the administration who brought you Iraq are preparing to do the same for Iran. The Pentagon, acting under instructions from Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, has tasked the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) with drawing up a contingency plan to be employed in response to another 9/11-type terrorist attack on the United States. The plan includes a large-scale air assault on Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. Within Iran there are more than 450 major strategic targets, including numerous suspected nuclear-weapons-program development sites. Many of the targets are hardened or are deep underground and could not be taken out by conventional weapons, hence the nuclear option. As in the case of Iraq, the response is not conditional on Iran actually being involved in the act of terrorism directed against the United States. Several senior Air Force officers involved in the planning are reportedly appalled at the implications of what they are doing—that Iran is being set up for an unprovoked nuclear attack—but no one is prepared to damage his career by posing any objections.
Commenting on this article, Jorge Hirsch (antiwar.com Nov. 26, 2005) warned:
It is truly peculiar, given the strident rhetoric the administration has launched against Iran, that it has not publicly accused Iran of having WMD. Contrast this with the case of Iraq. There are, of course, many administration documents that make such statements [1], [2], [3]. The U.S. also accuses Hezbollah and various Palestinian groups of being surrogates of Iran and terrorist organizations, and the 9/11 commission has suggested that al-Qaeda has ties to Iran. It would be relatively straightforward to connect the dots and make a strong case to attack Iran, much stronger than the case for Iraq ever was.
However, the administration is deliberately not "connecting the dots" publicly yet. Why? Because this time we are talking big guns, nuclear. If the administration did make its case public in advance, there would be enough time to check the veracity of the claims, and to consider whether they justify a nuclear strike on Iran. By keeping the information classified, the administration can prepare for the nuclear strike without being subject to public scrutiny. The dots will be connected after the bombing, too late for any debate.
This comment triggered a flurry of email messages among anti-nuclear activists trying to decide whether and how to respond to what Hirsch suspects is an imminent nuclear attack on Iran. Some say the danger is overblown, so the disarmament community looks silly reacting too vigorously. Others say that any report from anywhere that anyone is contemplating a nuclear attack on anyone else should be met with all the fury the disarmament community can muster.
As a compromise, Mayors for Peace, Parliamentarian Network for Nuclear Disarmament, Friends of the Earth Sydney and several other anti-nuclear NGOs sent a letter to the UN and appropriate heads of government demanding that all parties immediately renounce any military solution, and especially any nuclear solution, to the situation in Iran.